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Abstract: The environmental and social attitudes of consumers can greatly affect 
the consumption of common-pool resources by the whole society – as 
demonstrated by many experimental and theoretical studies. Rooting in the 
current knowledge of consumer psychology, and employing the game-theoretic 
modelling framework, we formalise the decision making process of individuals 
about their resource consumption levels depending on their  level of 
environmental concern, and relative importance placed on social and ecological 
information. Our model demonstrates, in a stylized fashion, how profound 
preference to social information can help avert free-riding behaviour and result in 
globally stable resource consumption dynamics. This avoids the “Tragedy of the 
Commons”, leading to affluence in the resource stock as well as in the individual 
consumption. Furthermore, we find that heterogeneity of the levels of 
individuals’ environmentalism promotes free-riding, whereas heterogeneity in 
relative information preferences helps avoiding tragedies. Our analysis 
demonstrates that accounting for heterogeneity of consumers and their social 
relationships can yield additional insights regarding to what kind of societies may 
have better chances to ensure sustainable consumption of a natural resource. 
Keywords: resource consumption; natural resource dynamics; social-comparison 
processes; tragedy of the commons; cooperation; heterogeneity 
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is of prime importance for designing an effective solution to phenomena, which are 
usually referred to as “The Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968). Social 
psychologists have carried out a wealth of research to identify factors driving the 
decision processes of individuals. For instance, Festinger (Festinger 1954) hypothesizes, 
that human beings are continuously driven to evaluate their decisions, and, in the 
absence of any objective non-social means, they do so by comparison with decisions of 
other individuals. Thus, if a consumer is uncertain about the state of a resource, she may 
make her decision based on the information gathered from other consumers. Simon 
postulates (Simon 1976), that individuals seldom optimize their outcomes over different 
available alternatives, mainly due to their limited cognitive resources, and instead act 
according to automated habitual behaviour. This implies, that although a consumer 
might be aware of the consequences of over-utilization of a natural resource, she may 
still do so according to habit, as long as the outcome is satisfying to her for the time-
being (assuming that there is enough of the resource to permit her over-utilization).  
These theoretical propositions have been supplemented by various laboratory 
and field experiments of common-pool resource settings. Samuelson et al. (Samuelson 
et al. 1984) conduct an experiment to observe how consumers respond to information 
on the overall consumption of the resource. They find that individual consumptions tend 
to increase over time, however there is little or no increase in consumption when the 
resource is being overused. Rutte et al. (Rutte, Wilke & Messick 1987) demonstrate, 
through an experiment, that consumer behaviour is determined by whether the society 
or the environment is held responsible for the scarcity or abundance of resource. They 
conclude that when the environment is held responsible, consumers give ecological 
information more preference than social information, for evaluation of their 
consumption levels. Accordingly, when the society is held responsible, social 
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information is given more preference than ecological information. Brucks and Mosler 
(Brucks & Mosler 2011) conduct an experiment to find what type of information is 
important to consumers while making decisions on consumption. They observe, among 
other findings, that when the resource availability is low, the importance of the 
information regarding the situation of the resource increases, while the importance of 
the information regarding consumption of other individuals decreases. 
Building on the aforementioned psychological research, scientists have proposed 
various computational models that simulate consumer behaviour during resource crises. 
Much of these models have been developed under the umbrella of “multi-agent 
simulations”, or “agent-based modelling” (these terms are often used interchangeably), 
in which several heterogeneous individuals (agents) are programmed according to some 
psychological rules. Such a framework can be used to identify key behavioural elements 
that shape large-scale societal transitions. Deadman (Deadman 1999) presents one of 
the first agent-based models of the tragedy of the commons. Since then, various 
computational agent-based models of resource dilemmas have been developed – see, for 
instance, (Jager et al. 2000; Feuillette, Bousquet & Le Goulven 2003; Jager & Mosler 
2007). These models differ in the principles used to simulate the behaviour of individual 
agents, as each group of authors, depending upon the posed research question, attempts 
to incorporate different psychological findings into the behaviour rules of agents. 
Bosquet and Le Page (Bousquet & Le Page 2004) give an extensive review of the 
development of this field and early applications to ecosystem management. 
Despite the power of computational agent-based models to reveal collective 
phenomena from individual interactions, they lack rigor, generality and elegance that is 
provided by mathematical models. Notable achievements on the latter front include, for 
example, Anderson (Anderson 1974) who describes the coupled dynamics of a 
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regenerating commons and the physical capital, as a system of few ordinary differential 
equations, and uses calculus to show that the model exhibits Hardin’s conclusions 
(Hardin 1968) explicitly. Anderies (Anderies 2000) applies bifurcation analysis to two 
separate models of resource exploitation: (1) the slash-and-burn agricultural system of 
the Tsembaga tribesmen of New Guinea, and (2) the exploitation of palm forests on 
Easter Island by the Polynesians. The analysis is used to study the long-term behaviour 
of both systems under different management/ behavioural regimes. The study suggests 
that successful institutional designs are highly site-specific and that a careful 
understanding of the “geometry” of the system is necessary for successful resource 
governance. Roopnarine (Roopnarine 2013) suggests simple differential equation 
models which separately illuminate three different aspects of the tragedy of the 
commons:  (1) the compulsion of individual users to act based on the action of other 
users, (2) the opportunities and limitations imposed by the networked nature of 
consumers, and (3) mutualisms as solutions to tragedies. Thus, these mathematical 
models are able to demonstrate and explain a certain phenomenon in a clear and 
tractable fashion, where a major focus is usually placed on the dynamics of 
consumption. Although no objective function or decision variables are explicitly 
included in their formulation, they typically assume some notion of rationality prevalent 
in the consumers. However, the theoretical findings provided by social psychologists 
are seldom incorporated in these models.  
The commons dilemma has also been studied extensively in the framework of 
game theory. In her seminal work, Ostrom states that all institutional arrangements that 
can be used to avert the commons dilemma are expressible as games in extensive form, 
and presents several such examples (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom, Gardner & Walker 1994). 
While she expresses institutionalization for resource governance as a non-cooperative 
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game, a large number of analysts have also used cooperative game theory to study 
environmental resource issues (see, for example, (Parrachino, Dinar & Patrone 2006)). 
Ostrom’s research has stimulated a vast amount of work, concerning use of the game 
theoretic framework for modelling strategic interactions between consumers of a natural 
resource (see for instance (Madani 2010; Cole & Grossman 2010; Diekert 2012)). 
Similar to system dynamic models, game-theoretic models also assume a notion of 
rationality, which is made explicit by including objective functions and decision 
variables in the problem formulation. However, contrary to dynamical system models, 
they either do not take dynamics into account or do so in a simplified manner (as 
repeated games). More importantly, most game-theoretic models, either seek an optimal 
strategy of resource extraction, or seek to design models that yield strategies similar to 
those observed in real-world scenarios, rather than focusing on strategies that accurately 
depict the cognitive process of the consumers’ decision making. We argue, that in order 
to increase the relevance of such models to real-world scenarios, it is necessary to 
incorporate the cognitive principles that govern consumer behaviour, as revealed by the 
psychological research. 
In this paper, we present a dynamic model of natural resource consumption, 
taking into account the psychology of consumer behaviour in an open-access setting. 
We depart from the computational model by Mosler and Brucks (Mosler & Brucks 
2003) and put forward a stylized version that is based on the same psychological 
principles employed in the original model. All essential psychological variables have 
been maintained in our model, which include the scarcity thresholds as perceived by 
consumers, the extent to which the consumers hold nature (or society) responsible for 
the state of the resource, and the social value of the consumers. While the original 
model assumes unlimited growth of the resource, we assume standard logistic growth, 
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which is more realistic. The logistic growth model and its variants are commonly used 
to model many renewable resources that saturate at a certain carrying capacity. Thus the 
resources which lie in the scope of our study include (but are not limited to) fisheries 
(Gordon 1954), forests (Fekedulegn, Mac Siúrtáin & Colbert 1999), vegetation (Birch 
1999), foliage (Werker & Jaggard 1997), saffron (Torabi, Saadatkhah & Soltani 2014), 
and so on. We do not, in this study, incorporate the effects of uncertainty in our model. 
Thus we assume, that perfect information is available to each consumer, regarding the 
resource quantity and the consumption of other individuals present in the system. While 
this is a strong and restrictive assumption, incorporating uncertainty is beyond the scope 
of this paper, as it would considerably increase the complexity of the model, and must 
be dealt with separately. Thus, we present the reformulation, which enables formal 
tractable mathematical treatment of the model. We carry out the steady-state analysis, 
consider our system in equilibrium and employ the game-theoretic framework to study 
what conditions lead to the commons problem. Namely, we introduce a non-cooperative 
continuous-kernel game to analyse the rational decisions of consumers for different 
combinations of key model parameters describing the resource dynamics and the 
society. Furthermore, we define a notion of “tragedy” in the commons game, based on 
the distance between the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto optimum. We then use 
exhaustive numeric simulations to reveal such trends in the system parameters, which 
are helpful for decreasing “tragicness” and are also beneficial to the resource stock. 
2 Methods 
Our starting point is the computational consumer behaviour model of Mosler and 
Brucks (Mosler & Brucks 2003), which we stylize by formalizing it into a mathematical 
form. The resource is supposed to regenerate according to the classical logistic growth 
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model (Perman 2003). To begin with, we consider a society consisting of two consumer 
groups characterized by significantly different psychological characteristics. Within the 
groups these characteristics are similar, thus the groups are assumed to be internally 
homogeneous. This phenomenon of social polarization has been well studied in the past 
and also observed in real-world settings (Chakravarty 2015; Zwiers, Kleinhans & Van 
Ham 2015). Under this assumption it is possible to describe their behaviour through two 
aggregated equations.  
Each group is assumed to have open-access to a resource, which it consumes by 
exerting some effort. The dynamics of the group’s effort are modelled based on our 
understanding of the cognitive process depending on certain psychological 
characteristics of the group. These characteristics depict: (1) the environmentalism of 
the group (the perceived benchmark quantity that the group uses to evaluate whether the 
resource is in abundance or in scarcity), (2) the social values of the group (how 
cooperative is the group), and (3) causal attributions of the group (to what extent does 
the group attribute the current condition of the resource to nature-induced reasons, as 
compared to society-induced reasons). 
2.1 Resource Dynamics 
Consider a society with two consumer groups, each having open-access to a single 
renewable resource. We assume that the resource quantity 𝑅(𝑡), available for 
consumption by the society at time 𝑡, has an associated growth function, which is 
logistic in nature. We further assume, that in the absence of consumption, 𝑅(𝑡) 
increases over time at an intrinsic (positive, constant) growth rate 𝑟 and saturates at the 
given carrying capacity 𝑅max. The two groups, each identified by its respective 
index 𝑖 = 1,2, exert effort 𝑒𝑖(𝑡) respectively to consume the resource. The resource 
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growth is, therefore, given by 
𝑑𝑅(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟 (1 −
𝑅(𝑡)
𝑅max
) 𝑅(𝑡) −  (𝑒1(𝑡) + 𝑒2(𝑡))𝑅(𝑡), (1) 
where each group’s harvest of the resource equals 𝑒𝑖(𝑡)𝑅(𝑡). Equation (1) is equivalent 
to the standard Gordon-Schaefer model (Gordon 1954), with the catch coefficient set to 
unity. 
2.2 Consumption Dynamics 
Here we define the dynamics of the effort 𝑒𝑖(𝑡) over time. We assume that the change 
in consumption of each group, is based on their weighing of two different factors, one 
pertaining to information about the resource quantity (the ecological factor), and second 
pertaining to information about the use of others (the social factor) (Brucks & Mosler 
2011). Which factor gains precedence over the other in the cognitive process of 
harvesting decisions depends on the individual characteristics of each group, depicted 
here through multiple psychological variables. The final change in consumption is the 
sum of the ecological and social impacts, where we define the impact as the product of 
the corresponding factor and its weight. Thus the change in effort is given by 
𝑑𝑒𝑖(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= ecological weight × ecological factor + social weight × social factor 
In what follows, we specify the ecological and social factors, and the psychological 
variables that determine the relative weighing of these factors to determine the change 
in effort 𝑒𝑖(𝑡). The final Equation is given by (2). 
Namely, Rutte et al. conclude from their study (Rutte, Wilke & Messick 1987) 
that consumers harvest more from the resource in abundance than in scarcity. They 
further observe that harvests for each individual tend to increase over time, except when 
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the resource is scarce, in which case it decreases. We implement this effect in our model 
by comparing the current resource stock with a perceived-by-the-consumer “scarcity 
threshold”, denoted as 𝑅𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑅max]. Thus we define the ecological factor for 𝑖 as the 
difference 𝑅(𝑡) − 𝑅𝑖. A positive ecological factor represents an abundant state of the 
resource, whereas a negative factor represents a scarce state. A scarce resource in the 
perception of group 𝑖 results in a decrease in consumption, whereas an abundant 
resource results in an increase. Note that that abundance or scarcity represent only the 
beliefs of the consumers and may or may not depict the objective state of the resource. 
While Mosler and Brucks (Mosler & Brucks 2003) assume the scarcity threshold to be 
constant for the entire population, we generalize by allowing it to be different for each 
consumer (thereby ascribing more influence of the heterogeneity of consumers). Indeed, 
consumers with different characteristics (age, sex, social class, political orientation, etc.) 
also tend to have different levels of environmental concern (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980).  
In the same study, Rutte et al. (Rutte, Wilke & Messick 1987) show that 
consumer behaviour differs, depending on the extent, to which they attribute scarcity of 
the resource to nature-induced reasons relative to society-induced reasons. For example 
in the case of a forest, nature-induced reasons may include less rainfall, volcanic 
eruption, and so on. Society-induced reasons may include extensive overuse by the 
consumers, pollution, and other practices that are harmful to the forest. We represent 
this attribution of 𝑖 as 𝑎𝑖 ≥ 0; where 𝑎𝑖 = 0 represents a consumer group, which 
associates the scarcity of the resource entirely with society, with increasing values of 𝑎𝑖 
representing increasing association of the resource scarcity to nature. As suggested by 
the aforementioned study, the consumers that attribute the condition of the resource 
more to nature, tend to give ecological information more importance. Thus we define 
the ecological weight to be equal to the attribution 𝑎𝑖. The ecological impact is therefore 
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given by 𝑎𝑖(𝑅(𝑡) − 𝑅𝑖), which means that a consumer group, which attributes the 
condition of the resource more to nature (thus having a high value of 𝑎𝑖) will manifest a 
higher ecological impact, than a group, which attributes the condition of the resource to 
society (having a low value of 𝑎𝑖).  
In his theory of social comparison processes, Festinger (Festinger 1954) 
postulates that people are less attracted to situations, where others are very divergent 
from them, than to situations, where others are close to them regarding both abilities 
and opinions. Therefore, we define the social factor by the difference 𝑒𝑗(𝑡) −  𝑒𝑖(𝑡), 
where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Thus the social factor is a measure of equality, with a low 
magnitude representing a society with equal consumption (dictating a lesser change in 
consumption) and a high magnitude representing unequal consumption (dictating a 
greater change in consumption). Furthermore, a negative social factor represents a 
higher consumption of the target group relative to the other group (dictating a decrease 
in the target group’s consumption) and a positive social factor represents a relatively 
lower consumption of the target group (dictating an increase in consumption). 
The social value of consumer group 𝑖 is represented by 𝑠𝑖 ≥ 0. Here 𝑠𝑖 = 0 
represents an extremely non-cooperative individual, with increasing values of 𝑠𝑖 
representing an increasingly cooperative individual. A consumer with higher social 
value will weigh equality more heavily than a consumer with lower social value. The 
influence of the social value of consumer 𝑖, represented by 𝑠𝑖 ≥ 0, is based on the 
assumption that cooperative individuals are more concerned with maximizing equality 
and respond with anger to violations in equality regardless of the effect on their own 
outcomes (Van Lange et al. 2013). Thus the social impact is given by the 
product 𝑠𝑖 (𝑒𝑗(𝑡) −  𝑒𝑖(𝑡)).  
11 
 
Thus in our assumed society of two consumer groups, the following equation 
gives the change in effort of group 𝑖 as a function of its individual characteristics, the 
current stock level and the effort of the other group 
𝑑𝑒𝑖(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
=  𝑎𝑖(𝑅(𝑡) −  𝑅𝑖) +  𝑠𝑖 (𝑒𝑗(𝑡) −  𝑒𝑖(𝑡)), (2) 
where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. The first term on the right hand side of (2) represents the 
weighted ecological factor, where (𝑅(𝑡) −  𝑅𝑖) is the difference between the perceived 
optimum and actual level of the stock, which is weighed by the attribution 𝑎𝑖. The 
second term on the right hand side of (2) represents the weighted social factor, where 
(𝑒𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑒𝑖(𝑡)) is the difference in effort between both groups, which is weighed by the 
social value 𝑠𝑖. It is important to note that the positive values of 𝑠𝑖 assumed here, imply 
that both groups are socially connected to each other, and have knowledge about each 
other’s consumption. 
2.3 Coupled socio-ecological system 
Together (1) and (2) describe the overall dynamics of the considered socio-ecological 
system of the two-group society consuming an open-access resource.  In what follows, 
we undertake some additional transformations, after which the model is able to capture 
the first principles more accurately, and the new variables have clearer interpretations in 
terms of the underlying theory. The transformations also reduce the overall 
dimensionality of the parameter space. 
Let 𝑥(𝑡) be the quantity of the resource relative to the carrying capacity 𝑅max of 
the environment and 𝑦𝑖(𝑡) be 𝑖’s effort relative to the intrinsic growth rate 𝑟: 𝑥(𝑡) =
𝑅(𝑡) 𝑅max⁄  and 𝑦𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑖(𝑡) 𝑟⁄ . Define 𝜌𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖 𝑅max⁄  as 𝑖’s scarcity threshold level 
relative to 𝑅max. Next define 𝜏 = 𝑟𝑡 as the new, non-dimensional time scale. We can 
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now express the system as follows 
 
?̇? = (1 − 𝑥)𝑥 − (𝑦1 + 𝑦2)𝑥, 
     ?̇?1 = 𝑏1(𝛼1(𝑥 − 𝜌1) + 𝜈1(𝑦2 − 𝑦1)), 
    ?̇?2 = 𝑏2(𝛼2(𝑥 − 𝜌2) + 𝜈2(𝑦1 − 𝑦2)), 
(3) 
where 𝑏𝑖  =
(𝑎𝑖𝑅max+𝑟𝑠𝑖)
𝑟2
, 𝛼𝑖  =  
𝑎𝑖𝑅max
𝑎𝑖𝑅max+𝑟𝑠𝑖
, 𝜈𝑖  =  
𝑟𝑠𝑖
𝑎𝑖𝑅max+𝑟𝑠𝑖
 and the over-dot represents 
the derivative with respect to 𝜏. Although the original weights 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑠𝑖 have different 
dimensions and thus are incomparable, the new weights 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜈𝑖 become 
dimensionless and can be compared. Furthermore, 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖 = 1, which means that 𝛼𝑖 
and 𝜈𝑖 are complements of each other. This reflects the bipolarity in social and physical 
dimensions as described by the theory underlying the original model (Mosler & Brucks 
2003). Thus 𝛼𝑖 can be interpreted as the relevance that 𝑖 assigns to ecological 
information and 𝜈𝑖 can be interpreted as the relevance that 𝑖 assigns to social 
information. The state variables 𝑥, 𝑦𝑖 and parameters 𝜌𝑖, 𝑏𝑖 also become dimensionless. 
Henceforth, we call 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜈𝑖 the ecological and social relevance of 𝑖 respectively, and 
𝜌𝑖 the environmentalism of 𝑖, where 𝜌𝑖 = 1 represents an extremely environmental 
group and 𝜌𝑖 = 0 represents an extremely non-environmental group. Here 𝑏𝑖 can be 
interpreted as the overall susceptibility (Friedkin 2006) of group 𝑖 to change in its 
consumption. All subsequent analysis in this paper will be carried out on model (3). 
Note that the dynamics given by (3) allow the possibility of negative values for 
𝑦1(𝜏) and 𝑦2(𝜏), which means that an interpretation of negative effort is required. As 
defined by (Perman 2003), all the different dimensions of harvesting activity can be 
aggregated into one magnitude called effort. Negative effort means any effort exerted 
for the sustenance of the resource. It is not limited to growing trees or breeding fish, but 
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can also include, for fisheries, the restriction of fishing gear, closed area management, 
awareness programs and so on (Worm et al. 2009). Similarly for forests this can include 
restoration of soil fertility, preservation of remnant vegetation and promoting 
community forest enterprises (Chazdon 2003; Bray et al. 2003). One can imagine 
similar realizations of all resources that fall under the scope of this study. 
Natural resources have been essential inputs to economic development, which is 
considered necessary to overcome world poverty. It has been argued for decades now 
that “development” cannot imply infinite economic growth, as it has obvious 
restrictions due to the finite limits of the environment, which houses our economic 
system (Perman 2003; Meadows et al. 1972). Many influential economists have 
championed the concept of a steady-state economy, where the question is not that of 
how to achieve maximum growth, but of how to realize the most attractive equilibrium. 
In the past, there has been extensive debate on the viability and usefulness for the 
practice of the concept of the steady-state economy. Some recent studies suggest to 
interpret the economy’s steady-state as an “unattainable-goal” (Kerschner 2010) and to 
view its analysis as an efficient tool, which is useful to guide the design of the long-term 
policy for real-world economies. This gives special importance to examining the steady 
states of mathematical models of economic growth and resource consumption, for 
providing long-term strategies especially in the context of sustainability. In this spirit, 
we analyse the equilibrium of (3), which is found out to be unique and given as 
 
?̅? =
𝛼2𝜌2𝜈1  + 𝛼1𝜌1𝜈2
𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2
, 
?̅?1 =
(1 − 𝜌2)𝛼2𝜈1 + (1 − 𝜌1)𝛼1𝜈2 − (𝜌1 − 𝜌2)𝛼1𝛼2
2(𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2)
, 
?̅?2 =
(1 − 𝜌2)𝛼2𝜈1 + (1 − 𝜌1)𝛼1𝜈2 − (𝜌2 − 𝜌1)𝛼1𝛼2
2(𝛼2 𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2)
. 
(4) 
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Here ?̅? turns out to lie between 0 and 1 for all admissible parameter values, which 
ensures a non-negative resource stock that does not exceed the carrying capacity. The 
efforts ?̅?𝑖 can be either both positive, or have different signs, which is discussed in 
Section 3. 
If equilibrium (4) appears to be stable, in the long-term, the society converges to 
a stable resource stock and stable consumption rate regardless of the initial state of the 
system. As shown in the Appendix, the equilibrium is guaranteed to be stable except for 
very small values of 𝜈𝑖 and 𝜌𝑖 which corresponds to a society that is extremely non-
environmental and has extremely low social value.    
2.4 Game-theoretic formulation 
The tragedy of the commons can be seen as one particular instance of the more general 
problem of eliciting cooperation between individuals, when there exists a temptation for 
individuals to defect. Hardin (Hardin 1968) was one of the first who proposed to 
employ centralized mechanisms to coerce a society in order to achieve collectively 
optimal outcomes in such situations. He further asserted that any decentralized 
mechanism, regulated from within the society, must necessarily fail in achieving those 
outcomes. This assertion was challenged by Ostrom (Ostrom 1990), who reported 
several real-world examples of successful institutions, conceived and regulated by the 
communities themselves, and used a game theoretic framework to conceive a new 
theory of collective action. Typical game theoretic formalizations, which have been 
used to depict tragedies, include the prisoner's dilemma, the assurance game and the 
snowdrift game. These games have been studied in both discrete and continuous action 
spaces (Doebeli & Hauert 2005).  
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Here we formalize the socio-ecological system in (3) as a static, one-shot two-
player game, in which two consumer groups (players) have access to a single common 
good (natural resource). Each group decides on the level of environmentalism 𝜌𝑖 ∈
[0,1] it manifests, which in turn determines the steady state effort it exerts in consuming 
the resource according to (4). Thus the set of alternatives available to each player is a 
continuum, which constitutes a continuous-kernel game. The amount of resource 
consumed by a group at the steady state is assumed to be its payoff i.e., the payoff 
function is given by 𝜋𝑖(𝜌𝑖, 𝜌𝑗) = ?̅??̅?𝑖 , where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
We now derive the Nash equilibrium of the constructed game. In this model, the 
Nash equilibrium represents a state of society, in which no single group has an incentive 
(in terms of increasing its payoff) to consume more of the resource (by means of 
changing its environmentalism) given that the other group adheres to its current level of 
environmentalism. Thus if both groups consume as prescribed by the Nash equilibrium, 
no group is expected to deviate from their consumption levels. It is defined more 
technically as follows. First consider the “best response” of a group, which is the level 
of environmentalism that maximizes its payoff, given an environmentalism of the other 
group.  The Nash equilibrium is then given by the intersection of two best responses 
𝜌1
#(𝜌2), 𝜌2
#(𝜌1) such that each strategy is a best response to the other. We find this to be 
given by 
𝜌𝑖
# =
𝜈𝑖(3𝜈𝑗 − 𝜈𝑖 − 2𝜈𝑖𝜈𝑗)
(1 − 𝜈𝑖)(𝜈𝑖 + 𝜈𝑗 + 2𝜈𝑖𝜈𝑗)
    (𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗). 
Note that the social relevance 𝜈𝑖 is considered as a given parameter here, and not as a 
decision variable. We find (see appendix) that including 𝜈𝑖 in the strategy set results in 
an infinite number of Nash equilibria defined exactly in the form shown above; so 
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treating 𝜈𝑖 as exogenous parameters simplifies the further analysis and seems not to 
affect the findings substantially. 
A property inherent to any representation of the tragedy of the commons is that 
individually rational behaviour leads to outcomes that are collectively suboptimal. We 
thus compare the environmentalism of each group at the Nash equilibrium with one that 
maximizes the utilitarian welfare function of total consumption 𝜋1(𝜌1, 𝜌2) + 𝜋2(𝜌2, 𝜌1). 
We find that the latter optimum (𝜌1
∗, 𝜌2
∗) is not unique, and is given by the following 
curve  
2𝜈2(1 − 𝜈1)𝜌1
∗ + 2𝜈1(1 − 𝜈2)𝜌2
∗ − 𝜈1(1 − 𝜈2) − 𝜈2(1 − 𝜈1) =  0, 
with the Nash equilibrium situated at some distance from it (naturally determined by 
parameters 𝜈1 and 𝜈2). We call this distance the tragicness of the consumption game, 
which, more specifically, is defined here as the length of the shortest line joining the 
Nash equilibrium and a point on the optimal curve (see Figure 1). Thus in a non-tragic 
game, the Nash equilibrium would lie exactly on the welfare optimal curve (resulting in 
tragicness equal to zero). All other games in which the Nash equilibrium does not lie on 
this curve are classified as tragic games, where the magnitude of the distance between 
the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto-optimal solutions is quantified through their 
tragicness. The concept of tragicness, which we introduce here, resembles the “price of 
anarchy” (Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou 2009), which is a ratio between the cost of the 
worst possible Nash equilibrium and the optimum of a social welfare function as 
measure of effectiveness of the system. Another similar concept is the “price of 
stability” (Anshelevich et al. 2008), which is a ratio between the cost of the best 
possible Nash equilibrium and the optimal solution. Both concepts have been applied 
widely in computer network design. 
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3 Results 
In Section 2.3 we presented the steady state of the socio-ecological system (3). Based 
on the values of parameters 𝜈𝑖 and 𝜌𝑖, two types of steady state behaviour may occur –
either both of the groups consume at a positive rate or one consumes at a negative rate, 
i.e., contributes to the resource, while the other free-rides and consumes at a positive 
rate. After presenting the comparative statics results for system (3) in Section 3.1, we 
attempt to answer the question of how to limit this free-riding behaviour by analysing 
the positivity of the steady state across the parameter space. This analysis is conducted 
in Section 3.2. The consumer game presented in Section 2.4 illustrates strategic 
interactions between two consumer groups. In Section 3.3 below, we explore how the 
game characteristics, such as the tragicness, steady-state resource stock, individual 
consumption and equity are affected by the model parameters, most notably, by the 
social relevance 𝜈𝑖. On this basis we deduce favourable conditions for successfully 
sustaining the natural resource, while also maintaining an acceptable level of 
Figure 1: An illustration of the definition of the game tragicness. 
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consumption. 
3.1 Comparative statics 
Here we inspect how the magnitudes of the steady-state resource quantity ?̅?, and the 
steady-state consumption efforts ?̅?1 and ?̅?2 change in response to changes in the 
parameters 𝜌1, 𝜌2, 𝜈1 and 𝜈2. We do this by conducting a comparative statics analysis 
(Perman 2003), which is undertaken by obtaining the first-order partial derivatives of 
each of the three equations in (4), and determining whether or not an unambiguous sign 
can be attached to each partial derivative. Table 1 shows the results for the analysis. A 
plus sign means that the derivative is positive, a minus sign means that the derivative is 
negative, ‘0’ means that the derivative is zero and a ‘?’ means that no sign can be 
assigned unambiguously to the derivative.  
 
From Table 1, we see that an increase (decrease) in the levels of 
environmentalism 𝜌1 and 𝜌2, always increases (decreases) the steady-state resource 
stock ?̅?. Thus higher environmentalism results in a larger resource stock at steady-state. 
In contrast, an increase in the environmentalism 𝜌𝑖 of individual 𝑖, decreases the steady-
state consumption ?̅?𝑖 of 𝑖, which means that environmental individuals consume less at 
 𝜈1 𝜈2 𝜌1 𝜌2 
?̅? 0 0 + + 
?̅?1 0 0 - ? 
?̅?2 0 0 ? - 
 
𝜌1 = 𝜌2 
 𝜈1 𝜈2 𝜌1 𝜌2 
?̅? - + + + 
?̅?1 + ? - ? 
?̅?2 ? - ? - 
 
𝜌1 > 𝜌2 
 𝜈1 𝜈2 𝜌1 𝜌2 
?̅? + - + + 
?̅?1 - ? - ? 
?̅?2 ? + ? - 
 
𝜌1 < 𝜌2 
Table 1: Comparative statics results for system (3).  
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steady-state. It can also be noted that the effect of 𝜌𝑖 on ?̅?𝑗, where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, is ambiguous 
and not much can be said by simply observing the first-order partial derivatives.  
The effect of the social relevances 𝜈1, 𝜈2 on the steady state varies according to 
the relative magnitudes of the environmentalisms 𝜌1, 𝜌2. When both groups are equally 
environmental (𝜌1 = 𝜌2) then the social values do not affect the steady-state. When this 
is not the case, the social value of the relatively environmental (non-environmental) 
group has a negative (positive) effect on the steady-state resource stock. Furthermore, 
the social value of the relatively environmental (non-environmental) group has a 
positive (negative) effect on the group’s own steady-state consumption effort. We see 
that the effects of the parameters on the relationship between the steady-state 
consumption efforts are not entirely revealed by this exercise, and require additional 
analysis to uncover. This is done in Section 3.2 below.  
3.2 Equilibrium and the free-riding phenomenon 
Ostrom’s work (Ostrom 1990) reports several real-world examples of free-riding in 
open-access resource settings, which is a major cause of concern for the successful 
governance of such resources. In such settings, the free-riding phenomenon corresponds 
to situations where certain individuals (the free riders) benefit from the resource without 
contributing to its sustenance. System (3) captures this through two possible types of 
equilibrium. We label these two types as the “self-reliant” equilibrium and the “free-
riding” equilibrium. The self-reliant equilibrium represents both consumer groups 
harvesting at a positive rate (both ?̅?1 and ?̅?2 of (4) are positive). The free-riding 
equilibrium represents one of the groups harvesting at a positive rate and the other 
harvesting at a negative rate (one of ?̅?1 and ?̅?2 is positive, while the other negative). 
Thus one of the groups exerts effort into increasing the resource quantity, while the 
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other free-rides and enjoys a positive consumption. 
 
An exhaustive simulation of the equilibrium consumption values in the 
parameter space is shown in Figure 2. We see that free-riding is excluded only when 
both groups have the same environmentalism level 𝜌𝑖. When groups are different in 
what concerns their environmentalism, the equilibrium is self-reliant if the group 
corresponding to the higher level of environmentalism has a social relevance beyond a 
Figure 2: Positivity of the equilibrium in the 𝜈1,  𝜈2 plane for different values 
of 𝜌1 and 𝜌2. The plots are symmetric in 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 and so the missing plots are 
simply a reflection of the existing plots about the symmetric axis. The free-
riding equilibrium corresponds to ?̅?1 < 0 < ?̅?2. 
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certain level. This level can be interpreted as the reluctance of the relatively 
environmental group to subsidize the consumption of the relatively non-environmental 
group. The reluctance increases with increasing levels of social relevance, and indirectly 
with the level of cooperativeness of the environmental group. Thus the more 
cooperative a group becomes (consequently possessing a higher social relevance) the 
more reluctant it is to subsidize the non-environmental group. This is consistent with the 
postulate that cooperative individuals promote equality, and favour outcomes which 
maximize joint benefits (contrasted with altruistic individuals, who willingly sacrifice 
their own benefit in order to maximize the benefit of others). Interestingly, it has been 
observed that cooperative individuals are also likely to have high levels of 
environmentalism and vice-versa (De Groot & Steg 2010; Gärling et al. 2003), which in 
the context of our model implies that it is really the social relevance of the groups that 
determines whether they end up in a self-reliant or free-riding equilibrium.  
3.3 Social-ecological relevance in the consumption game 
Here we present insights gained by observing how the characteristics of the 
consumption game depend on the model parameters and what it entails.  
3.3.1 The anti-tragic role of social relevance 
Cooperative behaviour plays a key role in avoiding tragedies and increasing the steady 
state resource stock. In our model, this effect can be observed through Figure 3(a)-(c). 
Figure 3(a) shows that the tragicness of the consumption game decreases as we move 
away from the origin along any of the 𝜈1or 𝜈2 axes. Furthermore, the tragicness declines 
with an increase in the average (over two groups) level of social relevance. Declining of 
the tragicness can indeed be seen as growing of coordination and cooperation (through 
increasing social relevance) between two groups. Games, which are less tragic, 
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correspond to affluence in the steady state resource stock, which in-turn also allows for 
a higher resource consumption at steady state. Thus the same trends can be observed for 
the steady state resource stock and total consumption rate in Figure 3(b) and (c) 
respectively. This shows that high social relevance not only decreases the game’s 
tragicness, but also favours higher steady state resource stocks and consumption rates.  
In the limit case of 𝜈1 = 𝜈2 = 1, zero tragicness is achieved over the infinitely 
many equilibria, and it is interesting to note that in this most affluent case, the 
maximum resource stock ?̅? = 0.5 and maximum consumption rate ?̅?(?̅?1 + ?̅?2) = 0.25. 
3.3.2 A positive effect of incongruity in social relevance 
The effect of incongruity or asymmetry5 in the social relevances on the game tragicness 
can also be observed in Figure 3(a). Moving away from the line of zero asymmetry (the 
45-degree line through the origin) horizontally in either direction results in a lower 
tragicness level. This effect of asymmetry on the tragicness is less pronounced for small 
deviations in asymmetry, which can be seen from the decreased slope of the level 
curves when they are near the line of zero asymmetry. When the asymmetry is large, 
this effect is more significant, which can be seen from the sudden slanting of the level 
curves when further away from zero asymmetry. Thus strong incongruity or 
heterogeneity in social relevance corresponds to less tragic games.  
Incongruity has a similar effect on the resource stock and total consumption 
rates, which can be seen in Figure 3(b) and Figure 3(c) respectively. In general, an 
increase in incongruity increases both. Note that the discontinuity of the level curves, 
which was present in Figure 3(a) is also present here at exactly the same points in the 
                                                 
5 Henceforth, we use the terms “asymmetry” and “incongruity” interchangeably with 
“heterogeneity”, a term commonly associated with large populations, in contrast to the 
system represented by (3), which considers two consumer groups only. 
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parameter space. However the behaviour of the curves is different in the centre. They 
are now concave, which means that small deviations in asymmetry are detrimental to 
the resource stock and the consumed quantity. However, large deviations in asymmetry 
are beneficial.  
3.3.3 Higher social relevance increases individual consumption 
In general, higher social relevance increases individual group consumption. Figure 3(d) 
depicts how individual consumption of a group changes as the social relevances are 
varied. The level curves in Figure 3(d) show three different behaviours. Near the 
symmetric line where 𝜈1 = 𝜈2, the consumption of the focal group increases with 
respect to the social relevance of both groups. However, this increase is more 
pronounced with respect to changes in its own social relevance, than that of the other 
group. Variation in the other group’s social relevance does not affect the group’s 
consumption, when the social relevance of the other group is low. Conversely, for low 
values of its own social relevance, the group’s consumption is affected only by changes 
in the social relevance of the other group.  
Also note that a group’s individual consumption increases monotonically with 
the other group’s social relevance only when its own social relevance is high. When this 
is not the case, a mode is encountered in the region where the other group’s social 
relevance is high enough – see the plateau in the upper right area of Figure 3(d).  
Furthermore, a group with a higher social relevance consumes more, than a 
group with a lower social relevance. Figure 3(e) depicts the difference in consumption 
?̅?(?̅?1 − ?̅?2) which always stays positive to the right of the symmetric line (𝜈1 = 𝜈2) and 
always negative to the left of this line. Difference in consumption is exactly zero when 
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social relevance for both consumer groups are the same. 
 
 (d): Individual consumption ?̅??̅?1 
 (b): Resource quantity ?̅? 
 (c): Total consumption ?̅?(?̅?1 + ?̅?2) 
 (a): Game tragicness 
Figure 3: Plots for different characteristics 
of the consumption game at Nash 
equilibrium, shown as the difference and 
average level of the social relevances 
ν1,  ν2 are varied. For completeness the ν1 
and ν2 axes have also been shown in each 
plot. The grey areas mark regions for 
which stability is not guaranteed. The 
plots for both groups are symmetric to 
each other, and so the conclusions drawn 
here for group 1 also apply to group 2. 
 (e): Consumption equity ?̅?(?̅?1 − ?̅?2) 
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3.3.4 Equity in social relevance induces equity in consumption 
Figure 3(e) shows the behaviour of the equity measure ?̅?(?̅?1 − ?̅?2) as a function of the 
average of the social relevances and their asymmetry. When the social relevances are 
close to equal (near the centre of the plot), the isolines are nearly vertical which shows 
that the average quantity of the social relevances does not affect equity in consumption. 
However, the equity is affected significantly by the asymmetry in social relevances. 
This can be traced by starting in the middle of the plot and observing the difference in 
consumption as we move horizontally in either direction. The difference in consumption 
is increased as we increase asymmetry until a peak is reached after which it decreases 
slightly. This shows that equity in consumption is the highest, when the social 
relevances are close to each other in value.  
4 Discussion 
Leon Festinger's theory on Social Comparison Processes (Festinger 1954) provides the 
rationale for Social-Ecological Relevance (SER), which is the core theoretical concept 
of the model in (Mosler & Brucks 2003). SER is one-dimensional and so the preference 
given to social factors is the complement of that given to ecological factors, which 
represents the bipolarity between social and physical dimensions. The model that we put 
forward here also captures this concept as 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜈𝑖 can be interpreted as the relative 
preferences given to the ecological and social factors respectively and as they are the 
complements of each other they depict the bipolarity inherent in the underlying social 
comparison process.  
Opinions on the effect of heterogeneity on successful resource management are 
highly variable (Varughese & Ostrom 2001; Bardhan & Dayton-Johnson 2002; Chand, 
N. Kerr & Bigsby 2015) and range from negative to positive to no effect at all. Our 
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model presents mixed results regarding heterogeneity in general, which suggests that 
heterogeneity is important in different ways across different factors. Section 3.2 shows 
that incongruity in environmental concerns promotes free-riding, whereas Section 3.3 
shows that incongruity in social relevance helps avoid tragedies. Note that they are 
expressed via the parameters 𝜌𝑖 and 𝜈𝑖, respectively, which are different in nature. 
Hence, while our model does not provide a straight-forward verdict on the role of 
heterogeneity, it does contribute to the debate by indicating, that heterogeneity may 
need to be exposed to a classification, which is deeper than the conventional 
classification of economic, non-economic and socio-cultural heterogeneity to correctly 
establish its correlation with successful resource management.  
Despite the aforementioned strengths of the model, there also exist some 
limitations. First, the psychological parameters of the system have been assumed to be 
constant over time. Although in some cases a society may exhibit unvarying 
characteristics (Friedkin 2006) for short enough time span, it is understood that in 
general, societies in the real-world are in a constant state of change. Second, the 
analysis presented here has been conducted for two consuming entities. Although the 
extension to an arbitrary number of consumers is fairly straightforward, the analysis of 
Section 3 does not scale very easily to higher dimensions and must be conducted in 
some other form. Third, the assumption of perfect access of each consumer group, to 
information on the consumption of the other groups, is obviously restrictive of a true 
representation of reality. Future work can be directed towards relaxing this assumption, 
and observing the implications it may have, on the conclusions drawn from the model 
we put forward here. Fourth, the conclusions of the current study have all been drawn at 
the steady state, while ignoring the transient behaviour. While a study of the steady state 
has its own importance, transient analyses might be able to provide additional insights 
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for several resource exploitation problems (Perman 2003). It is however beyond the 
scope of this paper and an obvious direction for future research. 
The basic model of (3) can be extended to an arbitrary number of consumer 
groups, which would then make it possible to incorporate the underlying social network 
(consumers are affected only by the individuals they are socially connected to). This 
inclusion of the underlying social network in the model makes it possible to look at the 
characteristics of socio-ecological systems with large consuming populations, as a 
function of network topology ( (Easley & Kleinberg 2010) gives an excellent 
introduction to the application of network science to socio-economic systems). It would 
also enable us to examine conditions on the network for which we are able to combine 
the individual consumers and view the system in terms of aggregate consumption of 
different consumer groups.  In fact, the dynamics of the society may also be viewed as a 
single entity by modelling it as a single consumer group with certain conditions of 
homogeneity holding within the network. Needless to say, the extensions to the basic 
model are many and there exist a number of directions for future research. 
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5 Appendix 
5.1 Stability 
Here we investigate the stability of the equilibrium of system (3). Before proceeding 
with the analysis, let us point out that there are two degenerate cases of the equilibrium 
(4). First, if both groups have extremely low social value, i.e., if 𝜈1 = 𝜈2 = 0, then an 
infinite number of equilibria exist if the groups are equally environmental (𝜌1 = 𝜌2), 
otherwise no equilibrium exists. Second, if both groups have extremely high social 
value, i.e., if 𝜈1 = 𝜈2 = 1, then infinite equilibria exist for all values of 𝜌1 and 𝜌2. We 
ignore these pathological cases in further analyses. 
The stability of the equilibrium point of system (3) can be investigated by 
examining the eigenvalues of the linearized system around that point. The Jacobian 
matrix of (3) is given by 
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[
1 − 2𝑥 − 𝑦1 − 𝑦2 −𝑥 −𝑥 
 𝑏1𝛼1 −𝑏1𝜈1  𝑏1𝜈1
 𝑏2𝛼2  𝑏2𝜈2 −𝑏2𝜈2
]. 
Evaluation at the equilibrium (?̅?, ?̅?1, ?̅?2) results in 
[
−
𝛼1𝜈2𝜌1 + 𝛼2𝜈1𝜌2
𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2
−
𝛼1𝜈2𝜌1 + 𝛼2𝜈1𝜌2
𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2
 −
𝛼1𝜈2𝜌1 + 𝛼2𝜈1𝜌2
𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2
 
 𝑏1𝛼1 −𝑏1𝜈1  𝑏1𝜈1
 𝑏2𝛼2  𝑏2𝜈2 −𝑏2𝜈2
]. 
The eigenvalues of this matrix are given by the roots of the following characteristic 
polynomial 
p(𝜆) = 2𝑏1𝑏2(𝛼2𝜈1𝜌2 + 𝛼1𝜈2𝜌1) +
𝛼2𝜈1𝜌2 + 𝛼1𝜈2𝜌1
𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2
(𝑏1 + 𝑏2)𝜆 
+
1
𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2
((𝑏1𝜈1 + 𝑏2𝜈2)(𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2) +  𝛼2𝜈1𝜌2 + 𝛼1𝜈2𝜌1)𝜆
2 + 𝜆3. 
The final expressions for the roots of this polynomial are not simple enough to work 
with analytically. It can be noted, however, that all the coefficients of p(𝜆) are positive, 
which is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for all roots to be negative and, 
hence, the linearized system to be stable. Whether or not the equilibrium is indeed 
stable can be checked by Routh's Stability Criterion (Franklin, Powell & Emami-Naeini 
1994), which for cubic polynomials of the form 𝑎𝑥3 + 𝑏𝑥2 + 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑑 is given by 𝑏𝑐 >
𝑎𝑑. For p(𝜆), this inequality is given as 
𝛼2𝜈1𝜌2 + 𝛼1𝜈2𝜌1
(𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2)2
(𝑏1 + 𝑏2)((𝑏1𝜈1 + 𝑏2𝜈2)(𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2) +  𝛼2𝜈1𝜌2 + 𝛼1𝜈2𝜌1)
> 2𝑏1𝑏2(𝛼2𝜈1𝜌2 + 𝛼1𝜈2𝜌1), 
which is simplified to 
(𝑏1 + 𝑏2)
(𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2)2
(
(𝑏1𝜈1 + 𝑏2𝜈2)(𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2)
+𝛼2𝜈1𝜌2 + 𝛼1𝜈2𝜌1
) − 2𝑏1𝑏2 > 0. (5) 
34 
 
It can be checked that there exist  𝑏1, 𝑏2, 𝜌1, 𝜌2, 𝜈1, 𝜈2, for which (5) does not 
hold (𝑏1 = 0.2, 𝑏2 = 0.1, 𝜌1 = 0.001, 𝜌2 = 0.1, 𝜈1 = 0.01, 𝜈2 = 0.9 is an example). 
On the other hand, the following inequality 
(𝑏1 + 𝑏2)(𝑏1𝜈1 + 𝑏2𝜈2)
(𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2)2
− 2𝑏1𝑏2 > 0, 
clearly offers a sufficient condition for (5) to hold. It can be simplified to  
 q(𝑏)  = 𝜈1𝑏
2 + ( 𝜈1(2𝜈2 − 1) + 𝜈2(2𝜈1 − 1) )𝑏 + 𝜈2 > 0, (6) 
where 𝑏 = 𝑏1 𝑏2⁄ . Note that the right hand side of (6) is a quadratic polynomial in 𝑏 >
0. As 𝜈𝑖 > 0, the graph of q(∙) points upwards and the roots are either complex 
conjugates or both real and positive. In what follows we examine the implications of 
each case in detail 
Case 1: q(∙) has complex conjugate roots i.e., the discriminant is negative.  
  (𝜈1(2𝜈2 − 1) + 𝜈2(2𝜈1 − 1))
2 − 4𝜈1𝜈2 < 0. (7) 
In this case (6) will always hold as the graph of the quadratic polynomial will lie 
above the horizontal axis.  
Case 2: q(∙) has both roots real and positive. This happens if 
  (𝜈1(2𝜈2 − 1) + 𝜈2(2𝜈1 − 1))
2 − 4𝜈1𝜈2 ≥ 0, (8) 
and 
 −𝜈1(2𝜈2 − 1) − 𝜈2(2𝜈1 − 1) > 0. (9) 
In this case (6) does not hold for those values of 𝑏 which lie between the roots of 
q(∙).  
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Thus (7) is a sufficient condition for stability. However, if (7) does not hold, then the 
system is stable, if (8)-(9) hold true and 𝑏 does not lie between the roots of 𝑞(∙). The 
regions in the parameter space where these inequalities hold true are shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Evaluation of the roots of 𝑞(∙). 
Figure 5: Here we evaluate the stability of (3), through inequality (5), as the 
parameters are varied. The nominal values for the parameters are 𝑏1 = 0.2, 𝑏2 =
0.1,  and 𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = 0.1. The plots obtained by interchanging the indices of the 
groups are symmetric to the ones displayed above and thus are not shown here.  
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Figure 5 shows an exhaustive simulation in the space 𝜈1, 𝜈2 ∈  (0,1) to 
determine when condition (5) holds. We see that stability is guaranteed in a major 
portion of the (𝜈1, 𝜈2) space regardless of the values of the rest of the parameters. Also 
note that for small values of 𝑟 and (𝜌1, 𝜌2), (5) simply reduces to (6).  
5.1.1 Global Stability 
Above, we derived conditions on the parameters for which the equilibrium is locally 
stable. Local stability of the equilibrium implies that there exists at least some region of 
the phase space, such that if the system is initiated from any point in this region the 
dynamics asymptotically approach the equilibrium. This region exists as a non-empty 
neighbourhood of the equilibrium, whose size may be determined through a global 
stability analysis, thus complementing the local stability analysis. However in this 
study, we do not focus on the transient dynamics (which would be explicitly dependent 
on the initial conditions), but rather on the steady state. Moreover, since a locally stable 
equilibrium point is reachable from at least some sub-set of the phase space, we argue 
that establishing local stability alone is sufficient in order to justify the conclusions 
drawn in this study. Nonetheless, the insights gained from a global stability analysis of 
the equilibrium can help us gain additional understanding of the model. 
In what follows, we summarize the stability properties of the system through a 
numerical simulation of probabilistic nature. It is important to note that there exist 
rigorous analytical techniques (Khalil 1996), that yield sufficient (but not necessary) 
conditions for global stability for non-linear systems. However, due to the deceptively 
complex nature of our system (including its dimension) and limitations on the scope of 
this study, the application of these techniques to our model has been designated to a 
future study. For the sake of this study however, the results of the simulation described 
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below suggest that for physically realizable values of the parameters and initial 
conditions, there do not exist any periodic or chaotic solutions, and thus all of the 
considered region of the phase space lies within the region of attraction for the 
equilibrium.  
The simulation consists of the following steps. First a parameter set 
(𝜌1, 𝜌2, 𝜈1, 𝜈2, 𝑏1, 𝑏2) is generated at random. Here 𝜌𝑖 , 𝜈𝑖 ∈ (0,1) and 𝑏𝑖 ∈ (0, 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥) 
where 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥 is to be chosen independently. The parameter sets generated must lie in the 
region where the system is locally stable. For the generated parameter set, 100 
trajectories are initiated at random. The initial points (𝑥(0), 𝑦1(0), 𝑦2(0)) are generated 
such that 𝑥(0) ∈ (0, 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥) and 𝑦𝑖(0) ∈ (𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥), where 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥 are also 
chosen independently. The trajectories are then run for time 𝜏𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 5000. With time 
step of 250 units, we register the percentage of total trajectories (for that particular 
parameter set) for which the norm of the derivative ‖?̇?(𝜏𝑘)‖ (where 𝑍(𝜏𝑘) =
[𝑥(𝜏𝑘), 𝑦1(𝜏𝑘), 𝑦2(𝜏𝑘)] (𝜏𝑘 = 0,250,500, … ,5000)) is less than some small value 𝜖, and 
plot it against time. The process is then repeated for 100 parameter sets. Thus there are a 
100 points corresponding to each value of 𝜏𝑘. 
The limits for the random parameters and variables are chosen so that the 
generated values fall within a range that mimics real-world behavior. This has been 
done as follows 
1. If the aggregate consumption effort is negative, then the resource can grow 
over the natural carrying capacity, i.e., 𝑥(𝜏) may take on values greater than 
one, which in the context of the model means that the resource grows 
beyond the carrying capacity. However even then there is a limit to how 
much beyond the natural carrying capacity the resource quantity can be 
stretched. In the case of forests, for example, using fertilizers and planting 
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trees can act as negative extraction efforts leading to the forest biomass 
growing over the natural carrying capacity. However, the limited amount of 
light coming onto the Earth, competition for light between trees and simply 
the space constraint will not allow the biomass to grow unboundedly and 
thus there will be some limit to it; similar examples can be envisioned for 
other resources as well. In this simulation, we choose the limit 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 to be 10 
units of natural carrying capacity.  
2. The value of 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 is used to determine 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑛 as follows. Let 𝑦 be a constant 
total consumption effort, i.e., ?̇?(𝜏) = 𝑥(𝜏)(1 − 𝑥(𝜏)) − 𝑦𝑥(𝜏). Solving for 
𝑥(𝜏) analytically it can be seen that as 𝜏 → ∞, 𝑥(𝜏) → 1 − 𝑦 for all 𝑥(0) ∈
ℝ and all 𝑦 < 1. This means that the lower limit for 1 − 𝑦 should be near the 
upper limit for 𝑥(𝜏), i.e.,𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥, and so we choose 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑛 = −10.  
3. We determine 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥 as follows. Again, assuming 𝑦 to be a constant, but 
positive consumption effort, we seek to find a value for 𝑦 (to be regarded 
as 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥) such that the corresponding solution 𝑥(⋅ |𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥) approximates the 
solution  𝑥(⋅ |∞). Since  𝑥(𝜏|∞) ≡ 0 the norm ‖𝑥(𝜏|𝑦)‖𝐿2 = √∫ 𝑥2(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
∞
0
, 
will be small enough for all 𝑥(0) ∈ [0,1]. We choose 𝑦 = 550 which results 
in ‖𝑥(𝜏)‖𝐿2 = 0.02. Since 𝑦 is interpreted as the total consumption and we 
have two consumer groups in the model, we set 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 225.  
4. To determine 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥 we note that 𝑏𝑖 is interpreted as the susceptibility of 
group 𝑖 to change in its consumption. Such a parameter is also found in 
similar models of opinion formation, where it is estimated to lie between 
zero and one (Friedkin 2006). Here we take the upper limit as 𝑏𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 10 
allowing some margin.  
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Figure 6 shows the resulting plot. Each point corresponds to an individual 
simulation with the generated parameter set and initial conditions; 100*100=10,000 
simulations were carried out (of which we resampled 14% of the cases when 
computational errors were detected – the source of these errors was the failure of the 
ODE solver to perform the integration; for this simulation, an adaptive version of the 
4th order Runge-Kutta method was used). The plot suggests that within the considered 
time horizon of 5,000 dimensionless time units, most of the simulated trajectories reach 
the origin with the given small precision; those which have not reached the origin yet, 
follow a decreasing trend which gives some confidence that they will reach it over 
longer time horizons. So at least for the cases that are randomly generated, the 
equilibrium seems to be asymptotically stable. 
5.2 Nash equilibrium 
Here we formally introduce the resource consumption game. Each player 𝑖 = 1,2 
Figure 6: The percentage of trajectories for which the derivative is sufficiently small, 
plotted as time progresses, for each parameter set. For this simulation bmax =
10, xmax = 10 ,  ymin = −10, ymax = 225 and ϵ = 0.01.  
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chooses her level of environmentalism 𝜌𝑖 and her social relevance 𝜈𝑖 (note that 𝛼𝑖 =
1 − 𝜈𝑖 and so 𝛼𝑖 is determined by the choice of 𝜈𝑖). Thus the strategy set for each 
individual 𝑖 is given as ?̃?𝑖 = {𝜌𝑖, 𝜈𝑖}. The payoff ?̃?𝑖 that each individual receives is equal 
to the amount of resource ?̅??̅?𝑖 that individual harvests at steady state, where (?̅?, ?̅?1, ?̅?2) 
are given by (4). Note that 𝑏𝑖 does not affect the equilibrium and thus is not included in 
the strategy set ?̃?𝑖. The game is defined as a 3-tuple ?̃? = 〈𝐼, (?̃?𝑖), (?̃?𝑖)〉 where 𝐼 = {1,2} 
denotes the set of players, ?̃?𝑖 = [0,1] × [01]; 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 is the strategy space and ?̃?𝑖: ?̃?𝑖 →
ℝ; 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 is the payoff function for consumer 𝑖.  
For the two-player game ?̃?, the pay-off functions are given as 
?̃?1(𝜌1, 𝜈1, 𝜌2, 𝜈2) = ?̅??̅?1 and ?̃?2(𝜌1, 𝜈1, 𝜌2, 𝜈2) = ?̅??̅?2, where 
?̅?(𝜌1, 𝜈1, 𝜌2, 𝜈2) =
𝛼2𝜌2𝜈1  + 𝛼1𝜌1𝜈2
𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2
, 
?̅?1(𝜌1, 𝜈1, 𝜌2, 𝜈2) =
(1 − 𝜌2)𝛼2𝜈1 + (1 − 𝜌1)𝛼1𝜈2 − (𝜌1 − 𝜌2)𝛼1𝛼2
2(𝛼2𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2)
, 
?̅?2(𝜌1, 𝜈1, 𝜌2, 𝜈2) =
(1 − 𝜌2)𝛼2𝜈1 + (1 − 𝜌1)𝛼1𝜈2 − (𝜌2 − 𝜌1)𝛼1𝛼2
2(𝛼2 𝜈1 + 𝛼1𝜈2)
. 
The best response of player 𝑖 is the strategy (?̃?𝑖, 𝜈𝑖) that maximizes ?̃?𝑖 for a fixed 
strategy of the other player 𝑗 ≠  𝑖. The best response functions are thus given as 
(?̃?𝑖 , 𝜈𝑖) = arg max
𝜌𝑗,𝜈𝑗
?̃?𝑖(𝜌𝑖, 𝜈𝑖, 𝜌𝑗 , 𝜈𝑗) . 
By calculating the partial derivatives and putting them to zero, we find that for a fixed 
pair (𝜌𝑗 , 𝜈𝑗), ?̃?𝑖(∙,∙, 𝜌𝑗 , 𝜈𝑗) is maximized not at a single point but along the following 
curve 
?̃?𝑖 = (
(1 − 𝜈𝑗) (𝜌𝑗 − 𝜈𝑗(1 − 𝜌𝑗))
2𝜈𝑗
)
1
𝜈𝑖 − 1
 +
𝜌𝑗 + 𝜈𝑗(1 − 𝜌𝑗)(2𝜈𝑗 − 1)
2𝜈𝑗
; 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈  𝐼; 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
A realization of this curve is shown in Figure 7. 
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The Nash equilibrium (𝜌1
#, 𝜈1
#, 𝜌2
#, 𝜈2
#), consists of all possible outcomes such 
that the strategy of each player is a best response to the other player’s strategy. Thus this 
includes all such points where 
arg max
𝜌𝑗,𝜈𝑗
?̃?𝑖(𝜌𝑖 , 𝜈𝑖, 𝜌𝑗 , 𝜈𝑗) = arg max
𝜌𝑖,𝜈𝑖
?̃?𝑗(𝜌𝑗 , 𝜈𝑗 , 𝜌𝑖 , 𝜈𝑖), 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼. 
Solving this condition algebraically gives the following description of the Nash 
equilibria 
 
𝜌1
# =
𝜈1
#(3𝜈2
# − 𝜈1
# − 2𝜈1
#𝜈2
#)
(1 − 𝜈1
#)(𝜈1
# + 𝜈2
# + 2𝜈1
#𝜈2
#)
, 
 𝜌2
# =
𝜈2
#(3𝜈1
# − 𝜈2
# − 2𝜈1
#𝜈2
#)
(1 − 𝜈2
#)(𝜈1
# + 𝜈2
# + 2𝜈1
#𝜈2
#)
, 
(10) 
which shows that there exist an infinite number of Nash equilibria in this formulation of 
the consumption game. 
5.3 Game tragicness 
In the consumption game 𝐺, the optimal strategy (𝜌1
∗, 𝜌2
∗) maximises 
Figure 7: An example of the payoff function of one player given the other player’s 
strategy (𝜌2 = 0.7 and 𝜈2 = 0.9). 
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𝐽(𝜌1, 𝜌2) = 𝜋1(𝜌1, 𝜌2) + 𝜋2(𝜌1, 𝜌2). 
Thus, 
𝐽(𝜌1
∗, 𝜌2
∗) =  max
𝜌1,𝜌2
 𝐽(𝜌1, 𝜌2). 
By calculating the partial derivatives and putting them to zero, we find that for any 
𝜈1, 𝜈2, 𝐽(∙,∙) is maximized not at a point, but rather along a curve, which is given by 
 2𝜈2(1 − 𝜈1)𝜌1
∗ + 2𝜈1(1 − 𝜈2)𝜌2
∗ − 𝜈1(1 − 𝜈2) − 𝜈2(1 − 𝜈1) =  0. (11) 
A single realization of this curve is shown in Figure 8. A “non-tragic” game is one in 
which the Nash equilibrium lies exactly on this optimal curve. A game, in which the 
Nash equilibrium does not lie on this curve, is a “tragic” one.  
 
 
We introduce the tragicness of 𝐺 as the Euclidean norm of the shortest line 
joining the Nash equilibrium given by (10) and the optimal curve given by (11), which 
is given as  
Tragicness =
|4𝜈1𝜈2
𝜈1(1 − 𝜈2) + 𝜈2(1 − 𝜈1)
𝜈1(1 + 𝜈2) + 𝜈2(1 + 𝜈1)
− 𝜈1(1 − 𝜈2) − 𝜈2(1 − 𝜈1)|
4𝜈2
2(1 − 𝜈1)2 − 4𝜈1
2(1 − 𝜈2)2
. 
Figure 8: An example of the optimal strategy curve (𝜈1 = 0.3 and 𝜈2 = 0.9). 
